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 What does democracy require of the UK’s devolution 
arrangements?
✦	 Devolved institutions must be representative and legitimate. They must rely upon 
freely and fairly elected institutions, built on and promoting democratic principles. 
Regional and local democracy should bring decision-making closer to the citizens. 
Devolved institutions should be created with popular endorsement to strengthen 
their legitimacy.
✦	 Devolution arrangements should be transparent and intelligible to the people they 
serve. The powers and competences devolved (that is, what functions are exercised 
and by whom) should be clear and comprehensible to the wider public. And the 
relationship between devolved authorities and the central government should be 
easy to follow. Clear and coherent devolution arrangements are essential if the 
general public are to hold decision-makers accountable. They are also key for policy 
actors at all levels of government in fostering more effective decision-making.
✦	 Under the principle of subsidiarity genuine scope for decision-making should be 
located as close to citizens (as low down in a governance hierarchy) as possible. 
This is to ensure that decisions attract consent, and interventions take place at the 
most effective and appropriate level of intervention.
✦	 Autonomous development is best fostered where devolved institutions can 
decide on their own democratic arrangements – such as setting their electoral 
arrangements and the size and nature of their political institutions.
The basic structure of the devolution 
settlements
Devolution encompasses a range of quite different solutions in three countries (Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland), plus markedly smaller delegations of powers to London and 
some English cities and regions. There remain important issues around the stability and 
effectiveness of these arrangements, which were designed to meet specific demands for 
national or regional control and to bring government closer to citizens. Diana Stirbu and 
Patrick Dunleavy explore how far relations between Westminster and the key devolved 
institutions have been handled democratically and effectively.
5.6
2655.6 The basic structure of the devolution settlements
✦	 Devolved institutions should be inclusive, and promote citizen participation by 
creating new venues and mechanisms for engagement on a wide range of issues: 
from early constitutional deliberation on the form and nature of self-governance 
adopted, through to the final policy-making process within the new system.
✦	 Democratically elected institutions must be able to effectively scrutinise the exercise 
of power at their appropriate level of government.
✦	 Constitutional and (or) legal protection is needed if democratic devolution is to work, 
requiring a formal, fair and clear mechanism for resolving disputes over powers 
and competencies between tiers of government. A system of inter-governmental 
and inter-parliamentary relations is needed to facilitate dialogue and negotiation 
between the different levels of authority.
✦	 Building new institutions takes a long time. So the arrangements of devolved 
governance should be durable and resilient in the face of political changes internally 
in their country or region, and at the UK level.
Most liberal democracies of any size in the modern world have moved away from being 
run as ‘unitary states’, with just one main centre of government plus a set of clearly 
subordinated local or regional authorities. For instance, some big European countries, like 
France, Italy and Spain, now have constitutionally protected regional governments, where 
before they were previously run as centralised Bonapartist states. Other liberal democracies 
are longstanding federal systems, notably Germany, the USA, Canada and Australia. So the 
UK’s rapid movement since 1997 towards creating more devolved government is something 
of a belated falling into line with wider trends in other medium to large democracies.
However, the UK follows a pattern of ‘organic’ devolution with varying powers decentralised 
to different countries and regions. This approach is very different from a federal state. 
Figure 1a shows that under federalism a written constitution (one that is normally fixed and 
hard to change) specifies just two ‘bundles’ of powers and competences. The first bundle is 
allocated to the federal or central tier, and the second bundle to the component states. All 
the states in federations have the same powers. The character of these allocations, along 
with the development of tax-raising powers and financial capacity at the two tiers, then 
create a system of inter-governmental relations. 
How does change happen in federations? The federal centre may pick up new functions 
not specified in the constitution, and it may equalise financial capacities across states. It 
can also subsidise the states to do things on its behalf, or otherwise intervene in society. 
But it cannot (easily) change the constitution’s existing allocation of functions. So the 
federal tier can only realise policy objectives that clearly fall within bundle 2 by persuading 
or incentivising the states who ‘own’ those issues. In addition, a Supreme Court polices 
the activities of both tiers of government impartially, and impartially regulates inter-
governmental relations.
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Figure 1a: How a federal government system works
By contrast, in the UK there is no written constitution, and the foundational principle of 
‘parliamentary sovereignty’ still implies that the Westminster Parliament ‘cannot bind itself’ 
legally (see Chapter 5.1). Alongside this, the highly political nature of the constitution 
allows for organic development to happen over time without the constraints of traditional 
constitutional amendment. A set of major policies (especially defence, foreign affairs, and 
most tax-raising and welfare) are ‘reserved powers’ belonging solely to the UK centre. 
Different sets of policy functions have been devolved to national institutions in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, in ways that politically seem binding, and may provide some 
constitutional protections to these governments. Yet as Mark Elliot  has observed: ‘As a 
matter of strict law, the UK Parliament has merely authorised the devolved legislatures to 
make laws on certain matters, without relinquishing its own authority to make law on any 
matter it chooses — including devolved matters’. As we discuss below, Westminster actually 
still legislates changes that affect devolved policy areas, albeit so far with the consent of 
the devolved countries’ legislatures. 
The extent to which devolved powers in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are 
protected constitutionally is still somewhat obscure, and the picture is different in each 
area, and has changed rapidly. The Scotland Act 1998 (and as amended since, most 
recently in 2016) set things up so that unless a policy area was explicitly reserved to 
Westminster then across most internal or domestic fields (excluding tax, social security and 
trade) all responsibilities within Scotland belonged by default to the Edinburgh Parliament 
and government. By contrast, in Wales a list of powers was initially just given as ‘conferred 
matters’ that the Cardiff Assembly and government could run. In 2017 a new Wales Act 
moved towards the Scottish model, so that in a (more restrictive) list of areas the Assembly 
is now the default legislature.
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 Figure 1b: The UK’s devolved government system 
 
In Northern Ireland there is a legacy (imperial-type) provision for devolved powers to be 
suspended and then taken over and run solely by the Westminster government – and this 
‘direct rule’ situation applied from 1972, when the old Stormont model folded, until 1998 
when the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly first began operating. Since February 
2017 the Assembly and Executive have been suspended because of political deadlock (see 
below), but (in theory) the devolved institutions remain in being and direct rule has not been 
formally triggered. This has left the Northern Ireland civil service to operate established 
policies on a ‘caretaker basis’ without any (explicit) political control.
Within England extensive powers have been devolved to the executive mayor and London 
Assembly in London, and lesser sets of powers to executive mayors in some city regions. 
However, Westminster retains an (almost) untrammeled ability to alter who is responsible 
for any policy function within England.
There is also an as yet unsophisticated system of inter-governmental relations within the 
UK, in which Westminster/England is the dominant player, accounting for five-sixths (85%) 
of the population. There are only two key co-ordination mechanisms. First, most taxes are 
raised by the UK government, and it then allocates funding to the three devolved countries 
using a crude, fixed rule-of-thumb known as the ‘Barnett formula’. The three devolved 
countries get funding as a fixed ratio of English spending. So if the UK government cuts or 
raises public expenditure in England, the same happens to the transfers from Westminster 
to fund the devolved governments’ services. 
Second, the UK centre has recognised a convention (named after a peer, Lord Sewel) which 
says that Westminster will not pass laws falling within the policy sets or responsibilities 
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of Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland without the consent of their legislatures and 
governments. The Scotland Act 2016 and the Wales Act 2017 embodied the Sewel 
convention in statute law for the first time, which was seen as a symbolic under-pinning for 
the permanence of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales. What this 
means in practice is much debated (see below). 
The UK’s Supreme Court has begun to play a key role in regulating inter-governmental 
relations between Westminster/Whitehall and the devolved governments. The Court is 
independent of Whitehall, and can in principle regulate how the centre behaves. But it has 
historically done so only in rather a light touch way, deferring to the need for a (national) 
executive government to operate effectively. 
Recent developments: Brexit battles 
In the Brexit referendum Scotland and Northern Ireland, plus the devolved city-region 
in London (with roughly the same population size as the other two combined), all voted 
strongly to remain in the EU. But most of the rest of England and Wales voted to leave. In 
the lead-up to the March 2017 triggering of formal ‘leave’ processes under the EU’s Article 
50 a Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) of the three devolved countries and Whitehall 
ministers was resurrected by the May government to facilitate dialogue and consultation. 
(The Committee had previously been in abeyance.) It had some success on making 
progress on detailed issues, but also generated a lot of dissatisfaction. A series of key inter-
governmental disputes have occurred throughout the Brexit process. The legal fog around 
the varying allocations of powers between tiers of government in the UK noted above 
remains pretty intense still because in essence:
✦	 On the one hand the Brexit process involves the UK as a whole leaving behind a series 
of international treaty obligations, and treaty-making is clearly a Westminster reserved 
function;
✦	in addition, Westminster ministers argue that where a common policy previously applied 
within the EU to the whole UK territory (as with international trade) then for economic 
integration reasons it must continue to have a common policy stance post-Brexit. 
However,
✦	on the other hand, many of the EU powers that are being repatriated under Brexit cover 
areas, such as agriculture, fisheries, transport, regional development and infrastructure, 
that clearly fall within the ambit of the devolved government in Scotland and (to a lesser 
degree) Wales. 
Figure 2 summarises a complex series of battles that have taken place since June 2016, up 
to the time of writing (September 2018).
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Figure 2: Three Brexit battles involving the devolved governments
Issue or 
case
What the Scottish, Welsh and 
Westminster governments argued
What happened?
Miller case In December 2016 Gina Miller argued 
at the Supreme Court that the UK 
government could not trigger Article 50 
to leave the EU without getting approval 
from the Westminster Parliament. 
Ministers argued that they did not need 
parliamentary approval, but lost this issue.
The devolved governments supported 
the Miller challenge, and raised the 
supplementary question of whether, if 
Parliament were to so legislate, would 
that Act require the consent of the 
devolved legislatures? UK ministers 
argued that, because leaving the EU was 
a treaty matter, it fell wholly within their 
reserved powers. This was the first legal 
challenge around the Sewel convention.
The result was disappointing for the 
devolved governments. The Supreme 
Court concluded rather ambiguously: 
‘[T]he UK Parliament is not seeking 
to convert the Sewel Convention into 
a rule which can be interpreted, let 
alone enforced, by the courts; rather, 
it is recognising the convention 
for what it is, namely a political 
convention, and is effectively 
declaring that it is a permanent 
feature of the relevant devolution 
settlement’ (p.48).
 EU 
Withdrawal 
Act 2018
Both devolved governments argued that 
the Act could not proceed without the 
consent of their legislatures, because many 
of the powers transferred back from the 
EU to the UK related to policy areas where 
they have default responsibilities. Leaving 
UK ministers to decide where repatriated 
powers should sit between Westminster 
and the devolved governments could 
unilaterally alter the balance of UK-tier 
versus devolved-tier powers.
The UK government argued that some 
filtering at UK level was needed to maintain 
UK-wide policies in its areas of reserved 
powers, but that agreement would be 
reached with the devolved governments. 
The Scottish Parliament voted in 
summer 2018 to withhold consent 
for the EU Withdrawal Act, supported 
by all parties except the Scottish 
Conservatives. The issue of whether 
Westminster can proceed without 
Edinburgh’s consent will be tested in 
the courts.
The Welsh government initially sided 
with Scotland, but later agreed to the 
broad legal framework proposed by 
Westminster – and on a process for 
working through the details of which 
powers will be devolved to them and 
when (which is not yet clear). Wales 
then withdrew its opposition to the Act.
Continuity 
Bills
Both the Scottish Parliament and the 
Welsh Assembly passed statutes by 2018 
asserting their sole right to legislate after 
Brexit in those areas passed back from 
the EU that fall within the scope of their 
devolved powers.
The UK government argued that both 
legislatures had exceeded their powers.
As part of its agreement with 
UK ministers on the process for 
transferring powers, the Welsh 
government promised to repeal their 
continuity statute.
The Scottish government maintained 
the legality of their continuity statute 
and the issue was before the UK 
Supreme Court at the time of writing.
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The process has become acrimonious in large part because, critics argue: ‘The devolved 
governments have been largely excluded from the process of defining the UK’s approach 
to Brexit and its negotiations with the EU, despite early promises by Westminster to the 
contrary’. How this major clash of constitutional claims, and the continuing Scotland/UK 
dispute over Brexit processes, will be decided remains unclear. But some resolution will be 
needed before the end of 2018.
Meanwhile, of course, since February 2017 the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly 
have been suspended, leaving UK ministers simply talking directly and separately with 
political parties there about how powers will be transferred post-Brexit.
Recent developments: the growth of devolved powers
Scotland: In the 2014, Scottish independence referendum voters chose to remain in the 
UK by 55% to 45%, but only after the Prime Minister David Cameron had promised major 
new powers for Scotland’s government. Devolution of tax-raising powers to Scotland has 
always been important in the context of enhancing the Edinburgh government’s autonomy 
and salience for voters. It was the centrepiece of both the 2014 Smith Commission Report, 
and the 2016 Scotland Act. This gave Edinburgh new powers to set air departure tax, to 
make an add-on to income tax rates and vary its thresholds, and to control various land 
and building taxes. The proportion of the Edinburgh government’s budget raised directly in 
Scotland will increase from 10% in 2014–15 to 52% by 2020.
In the area of social security, the Scottish government gained new powers over carers’ and 
disability welfare benefits, on topping-up reserved benefits run by the UK, and on creating 
new benefits (see below). In April 2018 the Edinburgh Parliament unanimously approved 
the SNP government’s proposals for Scotland to take over administration of these parts of 
social security spending, which will cost £2.8bn annually by 2021. The benefits covered are 
chiefly those for elderly and disabled people – personal independence payments, carer’s 
allowance, attendance allowance, disability living allowance and other disability benefits, 
winter fuel and cold weather payments, maternity grants and discretionary housing 
payments. This will be a substantial change: ‘When the social security powers are in place, 
[the Scottish government] expects to process as many [benefits] transactions in a week as it 
currently does in a year’. 
In Whitehall, raising taxes and paying out social security have long accounted for around 
half of the UK civil service and a similarly large chunk of running costs. The Westminster 
government transferred £200m to cover the transition costs for Edinburgh as it takes over 
these responsibilities, but Audit Scotland found that the total transition bill is likely to cost 
a further £60m. This seems a relatively small sum for the scale of changes, shedding an 
interesting light on the likely transition costs of Scotland becoming an independent state, 
which created controversy during the 2014 referendum. A 2018 SNP Commission Report 
(drawing on analysis by Dunleavy at Annex B5) found that transition costs will be modest. 
By 2021 Scotland will already have substantial tax and social security administrations fully 
in place. So the additional administrative costs involved in Scotland going independent in 
future could be further lessened. (For Scotland, see also Chapter 6.1.)
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Wales: The Wales Act 2017 also marks a significant reshaping of the Welsh constitutional 
settlement with a transfer of additional powers (for example over energy and harbours) 
and more autonomy for the Assembly in dealing with its own affairs, by devolving electoral 
franchise and powers over the size of the Assembly to Wales. Welsh ministers can now 
borrow up to £1bn for capital spending without needing Whitehall permission. And (like 
Scotland) the Cardiff Assembly and government now have default control over any policy 
area not specifically retained by Westminster. They have notably gained extra powers 
to regulate transport. An interesting development occurred in 2017 when the Assembly 
passed an Act that (taken at face value, and if upheld by the courts) disapplies in Welsh 
public services some provisions of a 2016 Westminster trade union law.
However, the likely durability and robustness of the Wales Act was criticised heavily, 
both while the law was under legislative scrutiny and after receiving Royal Assent. 
Constitutional preferences amongst citizens in Wales point to strong support for greater 
autonomy. Given the choice between the ‘Assembly to have more powers / Assembly to 
have same powers as now’, the largest group of respondents to the regular BBC/ICM St 
David’s Day Poll in March 2017 chose more powers. 
With the new powers to self-regulate Welsh affairs, the Presiding Officer of the National 
Assembly appointed an expert panel on Assembly electoral reform, which reported 
back in December 2017 recommending an increase in the Assembly size (to 80–90 
AMs), lowering the voting age to 16- and 17-year-olds, changing the electoral system and 
introducing prescriptive legislative gender quotas. The Assembly commission’s follow-up 
consultation (in 2018) sought the views of the Welsh public on these recommendations and 
will introduce legislative proposals in two stages to further shape the Welsh constitutional 
settlement (see Chapter 6.3).
Northern Ireland: The devolution settlement in Northern Ireland has not been working as 
intended since February 2017, when the top two parties (the Democratic Unionist Party and 
Sinn Féin) could not agree to form a power-sharing Executive (see Chapter 6.5). Despite 
new elections in March 2017, the Executive and Assembly remain suspended. If and when 
the reduced size Assembly (cut from 108 to 90 seats in 2016) and Executive restart, then 
some of its powers (on welfare reform, and corporation tax) have also been increased.
England: The process here long focused on the already powerful executive London mayor 
(and Greater London Authority), who is acquiring (over the next few years) commissioning, 
strategic planning, funding and regulation powers in health and social care. Outside the 
capital, new governance and leadership arrangements focusing on regional or metro 
mayors emerged piecemeal from 2014 onwards, initially in the absence of a clear legislative 
framework. The 2016 Cities and Local Government Devolution Act streamlined this 
process, and to date 11 devolution deals have been negotiated, and seven of them started 
working with direct mayoral elections in 2017 and 2018 (see Chapter 6.9). 
Some wide-coverage English devolution deals include areas such as all urban transport 
and infrastructure, health, skills and employment, enterprise and growth, housing, planning 
fire services – as in Greater Manchester with a powerful executive mayor. More modest 
deals bracketed as ‘devolutionary’ (because Whitehall has given up some powers) range 
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from combined authorities spanning city regions and led by an executive mayor (as in 
Liverpool City region) to combined authorities with a new elected mayor with much fewer 
powers (as in Cambridge and Peterborough), down to a unitary council and local economic 
partnership model (Cornwall).
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Devolution appears to be firmly entrenched 
in the national polities in Scotland and 
Wales, and also in London. Lesser devolution 
to elected regional or metro mayors has 
expanded radically within England in 2017–
18. Northern Ireland’s arrangements are not 
operating currently, but may restart, and 
retain basic support from voters there.
The overall UK-wide devolution project 
lacks any constitutional coherence. It has 
evolved piecemeal, in asymmetric and 
specific fashion in each case, making public 
understanding harder. The weaknesses of 
this mode of proceeding are demonstrated 
by the continuing constitutional clash over 
Brexit between the UK and Scotland, and the 
suspension of the unique Northern Ireland 
arrangements from February 2017 onwards 
forced by major parties refusing to co-
operate.
Electoral systems used in the mainland 
devolved administrations (Scotland, 
Wales and London) secure broadly 
proportional representation (see Chapter 
2.2). They arguably redress some of 
the representational defects inherent to 
Westminster’s plurality rule (FPTP) system.
The supplementary vote system used to 
elect the London mayour and new regional 
and metro mayors has also worked well to 
maximise their legitimacy.
Devolution deals in England have been 
negotiated in ways that lack transparency 
and have received little public scrutiny.
Some devolved legislatures have better 
records on gender representation than 
Westminster (see Chapter 7.2). There have 
never been under 40% women members 
in Wales, and never been under 30% in 
Scotland. Northern Ireland is still somewhat a 
laggard.
Turnouts in the new devolved mayor 
elections in England in May 2017 were 
somewhat lower than normal for local 
government (29% in Greater Manchester 
for instance). But turnout in any elections for 
new bodies (that have not yet done anything, 
and whose responsibilities are little known) is 
often lower.
All the devolved legislatures and executives 
in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland 
and London were popularly endorsed in 
referenda before being implemented. The 
same is true of some English devolution 
schemes outside London.
The English votes for English laws (EVEL) 
process has not created an institutional 
‘voice’ for England. It remains an opaque and 
complex parliamentary procedure, little used, 
very little known, and even less understood 
by the general public (see Chapter 4.1).
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
Stronger levels of citizen engagement with 
national legislatures have become the norm 
in Scotland and Wales, whereas they remain 
the exception at Westminster.
Inter-governmental relations between the 
devolved countries and the UK are very 
poorly developed, and do not include 
London. Perhaps as significantly, inter-
parliamentary relations are vestigial.
Future opportunities Future threats
The Brexit process has already initiated 
another period of extensive constitutional 
flux. A positive consequence could be 
a window of opportunity to initiate an 
inclusive, nationwide deliberation about the 
constitutional future of the UK. So far, only 
a few Labour figures have called for such 
national conversation.
There are concerns that as a result of the 
Brexit process, powers repatriated from 
the EU will accrue overwhelmingly to 
Westminster and Whitehall – as the original 
draft of Clause 11 of the EU Withdrawal 
Bill specified. To date the division of 
competences has only partially been 
resolved in outline. In April 2018, the Welsh 
government reached an agreement with 
UK ministers, but the Scottish government 
has not (see above). Critics argue that after 
the top-down Brexit process run by the May 
government devolution will be ‘yet more 
variable and even more disjointed’.
As Wales moves from a conferred power 
model (where Westminster says what it 
could control) to a devolved power model 
(where responsibilities in broad policy areas  
rest with them by default, unless otherwise 
specified) so there may be a better 
constitutional alignment with devolution 
practices in Scotland.
Further territorial divisions within the UK 
could be amplified by a second Scottish 
independence referendum. This possibility 
depends on the level of public support 
north of the border, but also on the 
perceived treatment of Scotland’s interests 
in negotiating the EU exit deal and the 
repatriation of powers.
If the UK government acts to repatriate  
powers from the EU honestly and in the spirit 
of subsidiarity, there are new opportunities 
for enhancing the powers and competences 
of all the sub-national legislative assemblies 
and governments. 
The level of dispute and contestation both in 
the courts and politically has already clearly 
increased as a result of Brexit. A Westminster 
‘act alone’, UK-centric approach to 
repatriation of powers, which seeks to evade 
proper parliamentary scrutiny and genuine 
involvement with the devolved legislatures, 
could pose a serious threat to the principles 
of democratic devolution.
274 5. How democratic and effective is UK national government? 
Future opportunities Future threats
The SV mayoral elections in future years 
will be opportunities to revitalise local 
democracy and to improve the visibility of 
devolution deals.
The Conservative 2017 election manifesto 
unilaterally proposed scrapping the 
supplementary vote voting system used 
for elected mayors in London and various 
regions, and replacing it with first-past-the-
post, which would radically lower the mayor’s 
legitimacy. The manifesto is largely history 
now, but that such a non-consensus policy 
(also overturning local referenda) could 
have been envisaged by the Conservatives 
is an ominous sign for the future of English 
devolution.
The further unfolding of Brexit
As the Brexit process enters a new stage of detailed ‘divorce’ negotiations with the 
European Union, a raft of new legislation will be needed to give effect to the multiple 
changes involved. It will cover policy such as agriculture, fisheries, transport, and economic 
and environmental regulation where the three devolved countries are primary actors within 
their own territories. The Legislating for Brexit: White Paper (2017) suggested that existing 
EU frameworks will in the first instance be replaced by UK common frameworks, moving 
powers back to the UK centre. Subsequently, ‘there will be an opportunity to determine the 
level best placed to take decisions […] ensuring power sits closer to the people of the UK 
than ever before’ (paragraph 4.5).
If a subsidiarity principle was followed in a full-hearted way, then devolved administrations 
and legislatures would see their functions and responsibilities greatly enhanced, and could 
play a vital role in the process. However, ‘legislative consent’ by the devolved countries went 
completely unmentioned in the White Paper, nor was there any indication of inputs to be 
made by the devolved legislatures. By April 2018, after many criticisms from the House of 
Lords and the opposition parties in the Commons, the UK government was still insisting that: 
‘The offer we put forward on clause 11 at Committee stage [of the EU 
Withdrawal Bill] would see the vast majority of powers flow directly from 
Brussels to Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast, just as the Scottish and Welsh 
Governments have argued. However, it is also vital we retain a mechanism 
to protect our internal market, our common resources, and our reputation as 
a credible international trading partner.’
The Sewel convention and legislative consent
If a Westminster MP seeks to ask a question of UK ministers about a matter that forms part 
of the devolved powers of the Scotland, Wales governments and Parliament/Assemblies 
(or those of Northern Ireland when operating) then the Speaker of the House of Commons 
will immediately intervene to rule the question out of order. So an outsider might have 
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expected that Westminster would simply have stopped legislating about issues that are 
now controlled by devolved legislatures.
In fact that has not happened. Looking for a moment just at the UK-Scotland case, on 
about ten occasions a year, in every year that devolution has operated, the Westminster 
Parliament has legislated in ways that change the powers of the Scottish government and 
the Edinburgh Parliament. But in each case they have done so after a Legislative Consent 
Motion (LCM) was framed by the Scottish government and accepted by the Edinburgh 
Parliament. In almost all cases the effect of the legislation has either increased or left 
intact but varied in some way the powers of the Scottish government. And these changes 
have been accepted because they improve policy-making north of the border, maintain 
consistency across the two parts of the UK, and can conveniently be ‘piggy-backed’ on 
England and Wales legislation going through the Commons.
The Sewel convention is an agreement that ‘Westminster would not normally legislate with 
regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent of the Scottish Parliament’. 
Initially rather informally established (like all other conventions), this was later formalised. 
A section of the Scotland Act 2016 clearly stated: ‘It is recognised that the Parliament of 
the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the 
consent of the Scottish Parliament’. It also now applies to Wales in the same form.
However, the UK government’s Devolution Guidance Note 10 interprets the Sewel 
convention very restrictively as follows:
‘[W]hether consent is needed depends on the purpose of the legislation. 
Consent need only be obtained for legislative provisions which are 
specifically for devolved purposes, although departments should consult the 
Scottish Executive on changes in devolved areas of law which are incidental 
to or consequential on provisions made for reserved purposes’  
(paragraph 2).
The difference between these two views is quite wide legally. For example, Mark Elliot has 
argued that if the Westminster government wanted to withdraw the whole UK state from 
the European Human Rights Convention (as the Conservatives in 2015–17 said they wished 
to do), then it could so – because the action does not relate solely to devolved powers (as 
Brexit does not). However, what Westminster could not do within the Sewel convention 
was then to put in place a ‘British Bill of Rights’ (as the Conservatives at one stage planned 
to do) – because this would vary the powers of the devolved country administrations and 
require their legislative consent. We have seen (above) that it remains to be clarified if the 
specific repatriation of powers from the EU proposed by the May government by summer 
2018 falls foul of the Sewel convention or not. 
The growing powers of the devolved governments 
As late as 2017 the varying powers of the devolved governments could still be diagrammed 
relatively easily, as in Figure 3 – which shows the proportion of each Whitehall 
department’s duties assigned to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (if its devolved 
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mechanisms were working, and not suspended, as at present). At the top of Figure 3 are 
‘domestic’ departments where most powers were devolved, and at the bottom are the UK’s 
outward facing ministries where nothing was then devolved. In between there was not 
much of a spread. A few Whitehall departments retained some minority powers in Scotland 
and Wales, while a few other central departments had ceded minute fractions of their role 
to the devolved governments. So the idea of a ‘clean split’ still confronted anomalies, such 
as Northern Ireland having zero control over justice, due to earlier sectarian problems; or 
Scotland and Wales having fewer Cabinet Office roles than Northern Ireland.
Figure 3: The estimated proportion (%) of each Whitehall departments’ functions devolved to 
the three nations in 2017
Percent of each 
department’s 
work devolved
Northern Ireland Scotland Wales
99–100% Department for Education; Department for Communities, Housing 
and Local Government; Department for Health; Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
100% Ministry of Justice
100% Department for Work 
and Pensions
91–92% Home Office; Department for Transport
81% Department for 
Transport
79–80% Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
10–15% Business, Enterprise, Innovation and Skills
4–5% Cabinet Office
1–2% Department for Work and Pensions
Less than 1% Cabinet Office
Less than 1% HMRC, HM Treasury
Zero Ministry of Justice
Zero Ministry of Defence; Foreign Office; Department for Exiting the EU; 
Department for International Trade; Department for International 
Development
Source: Rearranged from Institute for Government, 2017
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The mixing and overlap of roles is certain to increase because of changes already made to 
stave off Scottish independence in 2014. Figure 4 shows that the devolved governments 
have each received substantial tax-setting powers, with more to come in stages until 2019, 
and that their administration has been put in place over recent years. So a substantial set of 
powers are moving from HM Treasury.
Figure 4: Tax devolution since 2014
Source: Institute for Government, Whitehall Monitor 2018, Figure 3.16
How the Brexit process works through in the probably extended period it takes the UK 
to separate from the EU will also affect the further blurring of functions across the two 
tiers. Arrangements are only likely to get more complex, as away from the headline 
disagreements, the two tiers of government have already:
‘Agreed to the principle of establishing UK-wide “common frameworks” in 
key areas. For their part, UK ministers have repeatedly committed to the 
idea of some EU powers being exercised exclusively at devolved level after 
Brexit, and have now backed away from placing a reservation on “retained 
EU law”’.
Conclusions
Devolution in Scotland, Wales and London has strengthened representation, legitimacy 
and the inclusiveness of policy debates there. It also played a key role in Northern Ireland, 
and is likely to do so again, although arrangements there have been suspended now for 
18 months. Devolution in England outside London to regional and metro mayors has just 
begun but may help redress important democratic and scrutiny deficits within some parts 
of England. However, all types of devolution still lack clarity and coherence, with poor 
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inter-institutional relations and questionable constitutional and legal protections for even 
devolved powers in Scotland (the most powerful devolved country). As a result, the overall 
durability of democratic devolution in the UK seems still unsettled.
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